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The	Promise	of	the	Rule	of	(Environmental)	Law	
A	Reply	to	Pardy’s	Unbearable	Licence	
	
Jocelyn	Stacey1	
	
Introduction	
	
“The	 Environmental	 Emergency”2	argued	 that	 environmental	 issues	 confront	 lawmakers	 as	 an	
ongoing	emergency.	The	complexity	of	environmental	 issues	and	the	possibility	of	catastrophe	
mean	that	it	is	not	always	possible	for	lawmakers	to	foresee	an	environmental	catastrophe	or	to	
know	 in	 advance	 how	 to	 appropriately	 respond.	 The	 implication	 of	 the	 environmental	
emergency	 perspective	 is	 that	 administrative	 discretion	 is	 unavoidable	 in	 environmental	 law.	
“The	Environmental	Emergency”	argued	that	a	public-justification	conception	of	the	rule	of	law	
is	capable	of	providing	legal	constraints	on	the	exercise	of	this	discretion	because	it	requires	that	
all	government	decisions	be	publicly	justified	on	the	basis	of	core	common	law	principles.		
	
Those	subscribing	to	a	libertarian	position	are	likely	to	object	to	the	argument	advanced	in	“The	
Environmental	Emergency.”	Libertarian	or	classical	liberal	positions	rest	on	a	formal	conception	
of	the	rule	of	 law,	a	theory	of	 limited	government,	and	a	strong	emphasis	on	private	property	
rights.3	As	 such,	 libertarians	 are	 opposed	 to	 the	 delegation	 of	 extensive	 discretion	 to	 the	
executive	branch	of	the	state.	For	example,	Richard	Epstein	writes,	“the	cumulative	demands	of	
the	 modern	 social	 democratic	 state	 require	 a	 range	 of	 administrative	 compromises	 and	
shortcuts	 that	 will	 eventually	 gut	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 practice,	 even	 if	 the	 state	 honors	 it	 in																																																									
1	Assistant	Professor,	Allard	School	of	Law,	University	of	British	Columbia.	Thanks	to	colleagues	at	the	
University	of	British	Columbia,	Allard	School	of	Law	and	the	McGill	Faculty	of	Law	for	their	helpful	
feedback	on	this	reply.	
2	Jocelyn	Stacey,	“The	Environmental	Emergency	and	the	Legality	of	Discretion	in	Environmental	Law”	
(2015)	52:3	OHLJ	xx	[Stacey,	“Environmental	Emergency”].	
3	See	e.g.	Eric	Mack,	“Libertarianism”	in	George	Klosko,	ed,	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	the	History	of	Political	
Philosophy	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011)	673;	FA	Hayek,	The	Constitution	of	Liberty	(Chicago:	
University	of	Chicago	Press,	1960)	at	140-3;	Richard	A	Epstein,	Design	for	Liberty:	Private	Property,	Public	
Administration,	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2011)	[Epstein,	Design];	
Libertarians	argue	that	environmental	protection	can	be	assured	by	vindicating	private	rights	through	
common	law	property,	contract	and	tort	actions:	Richard	A	Epstein,	Simple	Rules	for	a	Complex	World	
(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1997);	Bruce	Pardy,	“In	Search	of	the	Holy	Grail	of	Environmental	
Law:	A	Rule	to	Solve	the	Problem”	(2005)	1:1	JSDLP	29.	
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theory.”4	In	 Epstein’s	 view,	 the	 ambitions	 of	 “the	 modern	 social	 democratic	 state,”	 which	
include	 environmental	 protection	 and	 land	use	management,	 inevitably	 succumb	 to,	 amongst	
other	things,	biased	decision-making,	retroactive	laws	and	misplaced	judicial	foci	as	government	
attempts	 to	 respond	 to	mounting	 social	 challenges.5	The	 libertarian	 position	 poses	 a	 serious,	
though	not	 insurmountable,	 challenge	 to	 the	public-justification	 conception	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	
that	I	introduce	and	defend	in	“The	Environmental	Emergency.”	This	reply	takes	the	libertarian	
critique	seriously.		
	
As	a	libertarian,6	Bruce	Pardy	could	have	mounted	this	kind	of	challenge	in	his	response	to	“The	
Environmental	 Emergency.”	 Unfortunately,	 his	 critique	 represents	 a	 regrettably	 missed	
opportunity	for	the	Osgoode	Hall	Law	Journal	to	be	a	site	of	serious	academic	exchange.	Indeed,	
Pardy’s	 response	 impedes	 such	 an	 exchange	 through	 a	 gross	 mischaracterization	 of	 my	
argument.	For	example,	I	am	said	to	argue	“that	the	state	of	the	natural	world	is	 incompatible	
with	 the	 rule	 of	 law.”7	I	 am	 accused	 of	 arguing	 for	 the	 nonsensical	 view	 that	 “unconstrained	
executive	 discretion	 is	 legitimate	 because	 it	 is	 constrained.”8	His	 response	 to	 my	 article	 is	
dismissive	 and	 condescending.	 In	 his	 view,	 I	 have	 “lost	 the	 will	 to	 abstract”9	and	 I	 “wildly	
extrapolate	[from	the	challenges	posed	by	the	ambiguity	of	language]	to	abandon	the	enterprise	
of	 expressing	 rules	 and	 reasons	 that	 limit	 the	 power	 of	 those	 who	 govern.”10	He	 calls	 my	
argument	“a	cop	out”11	and	“a	process	of	doublethink	that	would	make	George	Orwell	 spin	 in	
his	 grave.”12	In	 his	 view,	my	position	 is	 akin	 to	 that	 of	 “Henry	VIII,”13	leading	 to	 the	 comment	
“Off	with	her	head.”14	He	finds	my	argument	“amusing.”15	
																																																									
4	Epstein,	Design,	supra	note	3	at	12.	
5	Ibid	Chapters	11-13.	
6	Bruce	Pardy,	Ecolawgic	(Canada:	Fifth	Forum	Press,	2015)	at	75-6	[Pardy,	Ecolawgic].	Ecolawgic	is	a	self-
published	monograph	that	is	advertised	by	a	website	of	the	same	name,	complete	with	a	10-point	
“Manifesto”:	http://www.ecolawgic.com.	
7	Bruce	Pardy,	“The	Unbearable	Licence	of	Being	the	Executive”	(2015)	52:3	OHLJ	xx	at	8	[Pardy,	
“Unbearable”].	
8	Ibid	at	14.	
9	Ibid	at	12.	
10	Ibid	at	13.	
11	Ibid	at	12.	
12	Ibid	at	15.	
13	Ibid	at	6.	
14	Ibid.	
15	Ibid.	at	17.	
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I	was	surprised	by	the	level	of	vitriol	and	insult	in	Pardy’s	response.	It	was	all	the	more	surprising	
because	Pardy	was	 a	double-blind	external	 reviewer	of	my	article.	He	had	 the	opportunity	 to	
raise	his	concerns	in	that	capacity,	but	declined	to	do	so.		Instead,	he	shifted	from	the	position	
of	being	a	presumptively	impartial	peer-reviewer	to	that	of	a	polemical	adversary,	and	along	the	
way	was	allowed	to	essentially	co-publish	his	critique	of	the	article	with	the	article	 itself.	 I	am	
glad	now	to	have	the	opportunity	to	reply.	
	
In	 contrast	 to	 Pardy’s	 critique,	 this	 reply	 seeks	 to	 contribute	 constructively	 to	 a	 conversation	
about	the	meaning	and	purpose	of	the	rule	of	law	in	the	environmental	context.	It	does	this	in	
three	ways.	First,	this	reply	reclaims	the	environmental	emergency	framework	and	defends	this	
framework	against	the	libertarian	critique.	Part	I	argues	that,	by	focusing	on	the	administrative	
state,	 environmental	 libertarianism	does	not	 supply	 a	 theory	of	 law	 that	 adequately	 accounts	
for	the	possibility	of	catastrophe.	Conversely,	if	one	accepts	that	emergencies	can	be	governed	
by	a	 substantive	conception	of	 the	 rule	of	 law,	as	Pardy	seems	 to	do,	 then	 the	administrative	
state	 can	 also	 be	 governed	 by	 a	 substantive	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Part	 I,	 in	 short,	
reestablishes	 the	 essential	 connection	 between	 emergencies	 and	 everyday	 discretion	 and	
demonstrates	that	the	environmental	emergency	framework	does	considerable	theoretical	and	
analytical	work.		
	
Second,	this	reply	examines	Pardy’s	and	my	divergent	views	on	why	the	rule	of	law	is	something	
worth	having	in	the	first	place.	Part	II	contrasts	the	libertarian	understanding	of	autonomy	with	
the	understanding	of	autonomy	that	underpins	the	public-justification	conception	of	the	rule	of	
law.	 On	 this	 basis,	 it	 defends	 the	 public-justification	 conception	 against	 the	 charge	 of	
arbitrariness	and	argues	that	this	conception	is	at	home	in	Canadian	public	law.		
	
Third,	this	reply	sets	out	future	directions	for	an	environmental	research	agenda	based	on	the	
public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Part	 III	 accomplishes	 this	 task	 by	 taking	 up	
Pardy’s	 objection	 that	 the	 existing	 state	 of	 Canadian	 environmental	 law	 undermines	 the	
aspirational	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 that	 I	 defend.	 It	 argues	 that	 a	 commitment	 to	 this	
conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 has	 considerable	 potential	 to	 secure	 greater	 environmental	
protection	 by	 subjecting	 all	 public	 decision-makers	 to	 the	 obligation	 to	 publicly	 justify	 their	
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decisions.	 It	 points	 to	where	 greater	 attention	 is	 needed	 to	 better	 understand	 these	 linkages	
between	rule-of-law	theory	and	environmental	law	practice.	
	
I.	The	Challenge	Posed	by	the	Environmental	Emergency	
	
This	part	 reclaims	 the	environmental	emergency	 from	Pardy’s	confounding	characterization	of	
the	original	argument.	A	central	objective	of	“The	Environmental	Emergency	and	the	Legality	of	
Discretion	 in	 Environmental	 Law”	 was	 to	 draw	 out	 the	 implicit	 rule-of-law	 assumptions	 in	
Canadian	environmental	 law.	 It	 argued	 that	 conceiving	of	environmental	 issues	as	 an	ongoing	
emergency	forces	us	to	re-examine	our	most	basic	assumptions	about	 law	and	how	it	governs	
the	environment.	This	argument	was	framed	using	Schmitt’s	challenge;	that	is,	the	challenge	to	
show	how	emergencies	can	be	governed	by	 law.	“The	Environmental	Emergency”	argued	that	
Schmitt’s	challenge	allows	us	to	unpack	different	assumptions	about	the	rule	of	law	and	how	it	
can	 govern	 the	 emergency.	 It	 argued	 that	 a	 public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	
offers	a	full	response	to	Schmitt’s	challenge.		
	
The	crux	of	“The	Environmental	Emergency”	is	that	environmental	issues	constitute	an	ongoing	
emergency	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 theorizing	 about	 the	 rule	 of	 law.16	Environmental	 issues	 share	
the	epistemic	features	of	an	emergency.	We	cannot	reliably	predict	which	environmental	issues	
contain	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 catastrophe	 or	 know	 in	 advance	 how	 to	 respond.	 It	 is	 not	 that	
ecosystems	 are	 in	 a	 perpetual	 state	 of	 emergency,	 as	 Pardy	 suggests. 17 	Rather,	 their	
unpredictable	 nature	 confronts	 human	 decision-makers	 as	 an	 emergency	when	we	 are	 faced	
with	 an	 unexpected	 catastrophe	 that	 demands	 an	 immediate	 response.18	Moreover,	 because	
some	 catastrophes	 are	 unknowable	 in	 advance,	 we	 cannot	 always	 distinguish	 specific	
environmental	 issues	and	 subject	 them	 to	 special	 rule-of-law	 requirements.	All	 environmental	
issues	are	 therefore	 subject	 to	 Schmitt’s	 challenge.	 Schmitt	 theorized	 that	 the	emergency	 lies	
outside	the	 law.19	Accordingly,	 the	challenge	for	those	committed	to	the	 ideal	of	subjecting	all																																																									
16	Stacey,	“Environmental	Emergency”,	supra	note	2	at	5.	
17	Pardy,	“Unbearable”,	supra	note	7	at	12,	20.	
18	As	Pardy	notes,	there	are	multiple	reasons	why	the	state	will	respond	to	any	given	emergency.	In	
extreme	cases,	it	will	be	to	protect	human	life.	In	other	cases,	it	will	be	to	prevent	human	suffering,	
prevent	the	loss	of	biodiversity	or	ecosystem	function.	In	a	democracy,	it	is	likely	to	be	many	of	these	
(contested)	reasons	all	together.		
19	Carl	Schmitt,	Political	Theology,	translated	by	George	Schwab	(Cambridge,	Mass:	MIT	Press,	1985)	at	6.	
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political	action	to	the	rule	of	law,	is	to	demonstrate,	contra	Schmitt,	how	the	law	can	govern	the	
emergency.20	
	
Pardy	 critiques	 the	 environmental	 emergency	 argument	 on	 two	 fronts.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 he	
claims	that	the	emergency	argument	is	irrelevant	to	my	primary	concern,	which	is	the	ordinary	
and	 everyday	 exercise	 of	 administrative	 discretion.21	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 he	 dismisses	 the	
environmental	 emergency	 because	 he	 thinks	 it	 obvious	 that	 the	 emergency	 is	 (or	 can	 be)	
governed	 by	 law.22	The	 claims	 need	 to	 be	 unpacked,	 and	 it	 is	 far	 from	 clear	 that	 they	 are	
consistent.	
	
The	 administrative	 state	 is	 a	 central	 concern	 of	 libertarians.	 The	 administrative	 state	 departs	
from	 the	 formal	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 significant	 ways.	 Administrative	 decision-
makers	wield	 significant	policy	and	 lawmaking	powers;	 individual	 rights	are	adjudicated	upon,	
not	 by	 independent	 judges,	 but	 expert	 and	 partial	 tribunal	 members.	 From	 the	 libertarian	
perspective,	 the	 complexity	 of	 environmental	 issues	 is	 best	 addressed	 by	 individuals	 through	
free	market	transactions,	not	public	institutions.	As	Epstein	puts	it:		
“Repeat	the	same	exercise	of	voluntary	exchange	and	cooperation	countless	times,	and	
achieving	social	welfare	is	a	task	that	will	take	care	of	itself.	Why?	Because	the	regime	of	
freedom	 of	 contract	 works	well	 for	most	 small-numbered	 transactions	 that	 rest	 on	 a	
stable	distribution	of	property	rights.”23		
The	current	state	of	Canadian	environmental	 law	is	 far	out-of-step	with	this	conception	of	the	
rule	 of	 law.	 Accordingly,	 libertarians,	 such	 as	 Pardy,	 argue	 the	 solution	 is	 to	 eliminate	 the	
administrative	state.24		
	
The	 problem	 with	 this	 argument	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 account	 for	 the	 actual	 chance	 of	 an	
emergency,	i.e.	the	fact	that	some	environmental	issues	contain	the	unforeseeable	possibility	of	
a	catastrophe	and	it	is	not	possible	to	know	in	advance	how	we	ought	to	respond.	The	point	of	
using	Schmitt’s	challenge	was	to	highlight	the	fact	that	a	commitment	to	governing	through	pre-																																																								
20	Stacey,	“Environmental	Emergency”,	supra	note	2	at	8-9.	
21	Pardy,	“Unbearable”,	supra	note	7	at	15.	
22	Ibid	at	3-4.	
23	Epstein,	Design,	supra	note	3	at	32.	
24	Pardy,	“Unbearable”,	supra	note	7	at	21.	
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existing	 legislated	 rules	 cannot	 account	 for	 the	 inevitable	 discretion	 that	 will	 need	 to	 be	
exercised	 in	 response	 to	 an	 emergency.	 Eliminating	 the	 administrative	 state	 does	 not	 answer	
the	question	of	how	emergency	powers	can	be	governed	by	law.	
	
Pardy	addresses	this	 in	his	response.	Pardy	suggests	that,	when	an	environmental	catastrophe	
strikes,	 its	 response	 would	 be	 governed	 by	 statute,	 perhaps	 the	 Emergencies	 Act,	 or	
alternatively	by	the	Crown’s	prerogative.	Pardy	writes,		
whether	there	is	a	statute	providing	for	the	power	or	whether	the	Crown	is	exercising	its	
common	 law	 prerogative	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 statute,	 courts	may	 determine	whether	
such	an	emergency	exists;	and	thus	have	 jurisdiction	to	determine	whether	the	power	
applies	in	particular	situations	and	whether	the	Crown	has	acted	within	those	powers.25	
He	moves	too	fast.	He	does	not	elaborate	the	basis	of	the	court’s	jurisdiction	over	these	matters.	
The	 emergency	 perspective	 requires	 that	we	 unpack	 the	 possible	 sources	 of	 authority	 to	 see	
which	can	meet	Schmitt’s	challenge.	
	
Take,	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 the	 Emergencies	 Act.26	The	 Act,	 as	 is	 characteristic	 of	 framework	
emergency	 legislation,	 delegates	 sweeping	 powers	 to	 the	 executive	 to	 act	 in	 times	 of	 crisis.	
Nonetheless,	as	Pardy	rightly	notes,	the	court	possesses	an	interpretive	and	enforcement	power	
that,	 when	 exercised,	 ensures	 that	 the	 executive	 stays	 within	 the	 boundaries	 set	 out	 by	 the	
statute.	In	other	words,	the	court	maintains	legislative	supremacy	by	ensuring	that	the	executive	
does	not	act	as	a	 law	unto	itself.	However,	the	statute	does	not	provide	many	bases	on	which	
the	court	might	intervene.	The	statutory	language	permits	the	Governor	in	Council	to	declare	an	
emergency	 when	 it	 “believes,	 on	 reasonable	 grounds,”	 that	 an	 emergency	 exists.27	It	 further	
permits	 the	 Governor	 in	 Council	 to	 take	 emergency	 action	 that	 it	 “believes,	 on	 reasonable	
grounds,	 is	necessary.”28	So	long	as	the	Governor	 in	Council	offers	some	reasons	to	support	 its	
belief	that	the	measures	were	necessary,	any	reasons	are	sufficient	to	formally	comply	with	the	
statute.	As	 I	 documented	 in	 the	 environmental	 context,29	and	 as	David	Dyzenhaus	 and	others	
																																																								
25	Ibid	at	4.	
26	Emergencies	Act,	RSC	1985,	c	22	(4th	Supp).	
27	Ibid	ss.	6,	17,	28,	38.	
28	Ibid	ss.	8,	19,	30,	40.	
29	Stacey,	“Environmental	Emergency”,	supra	note	2	at	Part	II.B.	
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have	documented	in	the	national	security	context,30	judges	who	understand	their	role	in	purely	
formal	terms	consistently	capitulate	to	executive	pressure.	They	will	not	probe	the	executive’s	
reasons	 for	 its	 decision	 and	 therefore	 do	 not	 effectively	 constrain	 the	 exercise	 of	 executive	
discretion.	
	
This	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law—the	 formal	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law—fails	 Schmitt’s	
challenge.	 It	 fails	 because	 it	 turns	 the	 rule-of-law	 into	 a	 façade,	 or	 a	 thinly	 veiled	 cover,	 for	
executive	discretion.31	The	unpredictable	 and	extreme	nature	of	 emergency	precludes	 specific	
legislated	rules	and	requires	the	exercise	of	discretion.	Because	the	legislation	fails	to	dictate	the	
response,	the	court’s	role,	on	this	view,	 is	only	to	ensure	that	the	executive	formally	complies	
with	the	letter	of	the	statute.	Pardy	agrees	with	me	that	a	rule-of-law	façade,	or	the	creation	of	
legal	 grey	 holes,	 is	 a	 problem.32	But	 he	 does	 not	 articulate	 a	 clear	 basis	 on	which	 the	 courts	
ought	 to	 intervene.	 He	 emphasizes	 the	 role	 of	 precedent	 in	 judicial	 reasoning. 33 	Yet	 a	
commitment	 to	 precedent,	 when	 that	 precedent	 fails	 to	 meaningfully	 constrain	 executive	
discretion,	leaves	the	rule	of	law	hollow.	
	
More	promising	 is	Pardy’s	 suggestion	 that	 the	common	 law	has	 the	potential	 to	constrain	 the	
exercise	of	discretionary	powers.34	Unfortunately,	 Pardy	does	not	elaborate	how	 the	 common	
law	does	or	ought	to	govern	the	exercise	of	emergency	powers	(other	than	to	follow	precedent).	
He	 leaves	 us	 wondering	 why	 judges,	 not	 a	 democratically	 elected	 legislature	 or	 an	 expert	
executive,	 ought	 to	 have	 the	 last	word	 on	what	 constitutes	 an	 emergency	 or	 an	 appropriate	
emergency	response.	Common	law	constitutionalism—the	rule-of-law	theory	that	I	endorse	and	
explicate	in	the	second	half	of	“The	Environmental	Emergency”—supplies	this	answer.	
	
																																																								
30	David	Dyzenhaus,	The	Constitution	of	Law:	Legality	in	a	Time	of	Emergency	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	
University	Press,	2006)	[Dyzenhaus,	Constitution];	Jonathan	Masur,	“A	Hard	Look	or	a	Blind	Eye:	
Administrative	Law	and	Military	Deference”	(2005)	56	Hastings	LJ	441.	
31	It	also	fails	because	it	does	not	explain	how	there	is	any	legal	constraint	on	the	decision	to	suspend	legal	
order	(i.e.	the	decision	to	ignore	the	Emergencies	Act).		
32	Pardy,	“Unbearable”,	supra	note	7	at	20.	
33	Ibid	at	13,	16.	
34	Note,	however,	that	Canadian	judicial	review	of	prerogative	powers	is	far	more	nuanced	than	Pardy	lets	
on	with	his	reference	to	the	Case	of	Proclamations	1611.	See	e.g.	Black	v	Chretien,	54	OR	(3d)	215	(OCA);	
Lorne	Sossin,	The	Boundaries	of	Judicial	Review:	The	Law	of	Justiciability	in	Canada,	2nd	ed	(Toronto:	
Carswell,	2012).			
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Common	 law	 constitutionalism	 posits	 that	 “the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 a	 rule	 of	 fundamental	
constitutional	 principles	 that	 protect	 individuals	 from	 arbitrary	 action	 by	 the	 state.”35	The	
common	 law	 is	a	source	of	 these	fundamental	constitutional	principles,	which	evolve	with	the	
community	as	they	are	tested,	refined	and	redefined	over	time	through	the	process	of	iterative	
common	 law	 reasoning.	 They	 are	 constitutional	 principles	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 compliance	 with	
these	principles	is	constitutive	of	law.	What	counts	as	law—that	is,	which	public	decisions	have	
legal	 authority—is	 determined	 by	 their	 compliance	 with	 these	 core	 common	 law	 principles.	
Public	 officials	 are	 under	 a	 rule-of-law	 obligation	 to	 publicly	 justify	 their	 decisions,	 that	 is	 to	
demonstrate	 through	 reason-giving	 that	 their	 decisions	 are	 consistent	 with	 fundamental	
constitutional	principles.	Two	of	these	common	law	principles	are	reasonableness	and	fairness	
and	they	operate	to	protect	those	subject	to	the	law	from	arbitrary	decisions.	And,	as	its	source	
is	the	common	law,	it	cannot	be	suspended	and	replaced	by	a	separate	emergency	legal	regime	
during	a	time	of	crisis.36		
	
We	 are	 now	 in	 a	 position	 to	 see	 how	a	 substantive	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 constitutes	
legality	all	 the	way	down:	 from	an	existential	 climate	crisis	 to	a	discretionary	 fisheries	permit.	
Common	law	constitutionalism	meets	Schmitt’s	challenge.	It	provides	an	answer	to	the	question	
of	how	all	exercises	of	political	power—including	emergency	response	powers—can	be	subject	
to	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 It	 also	 provides	 an	 explanation	 for	 Pardy’s	 observation	 that	 prerogative	
powers	can	be	subject	to	the	supervision	of	the	courts.		
	
Pardy	misses	 the	underlying	connection	between	the	emergency	and	the	administrative	state.	
Adapting	or	eliminating	the	modern	administrative	state	does	not	answer	the	challenge	posed	
by	 the	emergency,	 the	ever-present	possibility	of	an	environmental	 catastrophe.	And	 if,	 as	he	
seems	 to	accept,	 the	emergency	can	be	governed	by	 law,	 then	he	also	has	at	his	disposal	 the	
																																																								
35	Dyzenhaus,	Constitution,	supra	note	30	at	2.	See	also	TRS	Allan,	Constitutional	Justice:	A	Liberal	Theory	
of	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001)	at	2.	
36	Being	common	law,	however,	it	is	subject	to	being	overridden	by	clear	and	unequivocal	statutory	
language.	However,	as	compliance	with	core	common	law	principles	is	constitutive	of	law,	when	a	
legislature	chooses	clearly	and	unequivocally	to	override	those	principles,	it	undermines	its	claim	to	
legality.	In	other	words,	such	a	statute	would	be	legally	valid	but	would	not	have	legal	authority.	
Dyzenhaus	analogizes	this	to	the	way	in	which	s.33	of	the	Charter	operates	as	it	overrides	a	finding	of	
unconstitutionality,	but	does	not	render	an	unconstitutional	statute	constitutional:	Dyzenhaus,	
Constitution,	supra	note	30	at	206,	211.	
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legal	tools	needed	to	subject	all	discretionary	powers	to	a	robust	conception	of	the	rule	of	law.	
He	simply	chooses	not	to	use	them.	
	
II.	The	Aspirations	of	the	Rule	of	Law	
	
This	 part	 addresses	 the	 heart	 of	my	 disagreement	with	 Pardy.	 That	 disagreement	 is	 over	 the	
meaning	of	the	rule	of	law	and	how	Canadian	environmental	law	can	realize	rule-of-law	ideals.	
Pardy	and	I	agree	that	the	basic	commitment	to	governance	under	the	rule	of	law	can	ensure	a	
measure	of	environmental	protection.	We	also	agree	that,	at	present,	Canadian	environmental	
law	is	dire	need	of	reform	to	comply	with	the	rule	of	law.	We	fundamentally	disagree,	however,	
on	how	 the	 rule	of	 law	 can	be	 realized	 in	Canadian	environmental	 law.	 This	part	 responds	 to	
Pardy’s	assertion	that	a	common	law	constitutional	conception	of	the	rule	of	law	is	a	license	for	
arbitrariness.	It	argues	that	common	law	constitutionalism	gives	rise	to	a	requirement	of	public	
justification.	 This	 requirement	 imposes	meaningful	 obligations	 on	 public	 officials	 that	 protect	
the	 autonomy	 of	 those	 subject	 to	 the	 law	 and	 enable	 their	 participation	 in	 the	 project	 of	
elaborating	the	content	of	the	law.	
	
Libertarians	understand	autonomy	as	freedom	from	state	interference.37	The	formal	conception	
of	the	rule	of	law	serves	to	protect	autonomy,	understood	in	this	way,	by	requiring	state	action	
to	 comply	 with	 the	 formal	 features	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law:	 publicly	 announced,	 general,	 clear,	
prospective	and	stable	rules	that	are	enforced	consistently	with	the	stated	rule.38	These	formal	
features	 prevent	 the	 state	 from	 treating	 people	 arbitrarily—using	 them	 as	 means	 to	 ends—
because	it	must	act	through	impersonal,	abstract	and	prospective	rules.39		
	
Pardy	 gives	 libertarianism	 a	 distinctly	 ecological	 spin.	 His	 account	 is	 designed	 to	 mirror	 the	
systems	dynamics	of	biological	competition	and	the	free	market.	He	writes:	
																																																								
37	Hayek,	supra	note	3	at	133	ff	(on	freedom	as	the	absence	of	coercion);	Richard	A	Epstein,	The	Classical	
Liberal	Constitution:	The	Quest	for	Limited	Government	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2014)	at	35	
(referring	to	“classical	liberal	ideal	of	negative	liberty”)	and	Chapters	21,	22	(on	economic	freedoms);	
Pardy,	Ecolawgic,	supra	note	6	at	72,	76.	
38	Lon	Fuller,	The	Morality	of	Law,	revised	ed	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1969).	Relied	on	by	
Epstein,	Design,	supra	note	3	at	19	ff.	
39	Hayek,	supra	note	3	at	153.	
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In	ecosystems	and	markets,	there	is	no	notion	of	common	good,	equality	of	outcome	or	
distributive	 justice.	 …	 No	 one	 expropriates	 a	 squirrel’s	 nuts	 for	 redistribution.	 The	
squirrel	 loses	his	nuts	only	to	 larger	squirrels	who	[sic]	 take	them	by	force.	The	use	of	
state	coercion	to	redistribute	resources	opposes	system	dynamics.	…40		
Pardy’s	aspiration	for	the	rule	of	law	is	to	create	and	maintain	a	survival-of-the-fittest,	winner-
takes-all	 society.	 It	 is	 openly	hostile	 to	notions	of	distributive	 justice,41	dismissive	of	 collective	
reasoning42 	and	 disconnected	 from	 any	 theory	 of	 democracy. 43 	Moreover,	 in	 his	 account,	
environmental	 protection	 is	 only	 assured	 when	 there	 is	 a	 sufficiently	 motivated	 and	 capable	
individual	who	can	defend	 in	court	her	 (property)	 rights	against	 “permanent”	and	“unnatural”	
ecological	interference.44		
	
The	 public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 that	 I	 introduced	 in	 “The	 Environmental	
Emergency”	also	seeks	 to	protect	 individuals	 from	arbitrariness.	But,	unlike	Pardy,	 it	builds	on	
the	republican	notion	of	autonomy	as	non-domination,	or	 the	 idea	that	 individuals	should	not	
be	 subject	 to	 the	 arbitrary	 will	 of	 another.45	The	 rule	 of	 law,	 from	 this	 perspective,	 protects	
individuals	both	from	arbitrary	decisions	and	the	threat	of	arbitrary	decisions.	The	strengths	of	
this	 conception	 of	 autonomy	 have	 been	 articulated	 and	 defended	 elsewhere	 and	will	 not	 be	
rehearsed	 here.46	Non-domination	 is	 a	 conception	 of	 autonomy	 that	 gives	 primacy	 to	 human	
agency	and	equality.	It	is	this	notion	of	autonomy	that	is	presupposed	by	the	version	of	common	
law	constitutionalism	that	I	defend.		
	
Public	decisions	 that	are	not	publicly	 justified	on	 the	basis	of	 core	common	 law	principles	are	
arbitrary.	 Common	 law	 constitutionalism	 guards	 against	 this	 arbitrariness	 by	 imposing	 a	
requirement	 of	 public	 justification	 on	 all	 public	 decision-makers	 and	 by	 requiring	 appropriate																																																									
40	Pardy,	Ecolawgic,	supra	note	6	at	75.	
41	Ibid.	
42	Bruce	Pardy,	Environmental	Assessment:	Three	Ways	Not	to	Do	Environmental	Law”	(2010)	21	JELP	139	
at	141-2.	
43	Ecolawgic	only	references	democratic	accountability	when	he	is	critiquing	other	theories:	Pardy,	
Ecowlawgic,	supra	note	6	at	4,	82,	85	and	91.	
44	Ibid	at	Chapter	5,	Part	C;	Pardy,	“Holy	Grail”,	supra	note	3.	
45	David	Dyzenhaus,	“Rand's	Legal	Republicanism”	(2010)	55	McGill	L	J	491.	Republicanism	as	elaborated	
by	Philip	Pettit,	Republicanism:	A	Theory	of	Freedom	and	Government	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	
1999)	and	Henry	S.	Richardson,	Democratic	Autonomy:	Public	Reasoning	About	the	Ends	of	Policy	(Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	2002)	at	30-5.	
46	Pettit,	supra	note	45	at	Chapter	3.	
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institutional	channels	(including,	but	not	limited	to	the	courts)	for	challenging	decisions	that	are	
perceived	as	unjustified.	Decision-makers	must	disclose	reasons	that	justify	their	decisions,	and	
moreover,	these	reasons	must	be	consistent	with	core	constitutional	principles	of	fairness	and	
reasonableness.	When	 they	 are	 not	 reasoned	 in	 this	 way,	 courts	 and	 other	 reviewing	 bodies	
(such	as	appeals	 tribunals)	have	a	basis	on	which	 to	 intervene.	Publicly	 justified	decisions,	 i.e.	
decisions	 that	 are	 fair	 and	 reasonable,	 protect	 the	 individual’s	 status	 as	 an	 autonomous	 and	
equal	subject	before	the	law.	But	the	process	of	public	justification	also	enables	the	individual	to	
participate	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 law	 because	 it	 provides	 mechanisms	 through	 which	
individuals	 can	 contest	 public	 decisions	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 do	 not	 in	 fact	 reflect	 core	
constitutional	principles.		
	
The	 public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 inherently	 participatory.	 The	
participation	 of	 the	 individual	 subject	 to	 the	 law	 is	 made	 internal	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 two	
respects.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 the	 individual’s	 autonomy	 interest	 must	 always	 be	 in	 the	
contemplation	of	the	public	official	because	she	must	issue	reasoned,	not	arbitrary,	decisions.47	
In	the	second	instance,	the	formal	features	of	the	rule	of	law	ensure	that	the	content	of	the	law	
is	communicated	in	a	way	that	can	be	understood,	deliberated	upon	and	contested	by	the	legal	
subject.48	The	rule	of	 law,	 in	other	words,	ensures	 the	 legal	 subject	knows	where	he	stands	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 law,	and	 can	plan	his	 life	 accordingly,	but	 it	 also	ensures	 that	he	 is	 entitled	 to	
participate	in	the	project	of	elaborating	the	content	of	the	law	that	he	is	subject	to.	A	system	of	
law	 that	 is	 comprised	 of	 rules	 that	 comply	 with	 the	 formal	 requirements	 of	 law	 (general,	
prospective,	public,	etc)	respects	the	autonomy	of	those	subject	to	the	law.	But	a	system	of	law	
that	includes	an	administrative	state	with	extensive	discretionary	powers	can	also	comply	with	
the	 rule	 of	 law	 by	 ensuring	 that	 when	 those	 delegated	 powers	 are	 implemented	 they	 are	
publicly	justified.		
	
The	public-justification	conception	does	not	“object	to	the	concept	of	rules,”49	as	Pardy	asserts.	
Environmental	rules	that	comply	with	the	formal	features	associated	with	the	rule	of	law	fulfill	
the	requirements	of	public	justification;	they	respect	and	enable	the	autonomy	of	those	subject																																																									
47	Kristen	Rundle,	Forms	Liberate:	Reclaiming	the	Jurisprudence	of	Lon	L	Fuller	(Oxford	and	Portland:	Hart	
Publishing,	2012)	at	2,	134;	Fuller,	supra	note	38	at	210,	219.	
48	Hoi	Kong,	"Election	Law	and	Deliberative	Democracy:	Against	Deflation"	(2015)	9	JPPL	35	at	41.	
49	Pardy,	“Unbearable”,	supra	note	7	at	12.	
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to	the	law.	Environmental	rules	are	unproblematic	from	the	perspective	of	either	the	formal	or	
public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 But	 what	 the	 environmental	 emergency	
reveals	is	that	any	theory	of	law	that	is	based	solely	on	rules	is	wholly	inadequate,	and	glaringly	
so	in	the	face	of	environmental	catastrophes	and	complex,	ever-changing	environmental	issues.	
As	I	explained	in	the	original	article,	the	formal	features	that	comprise	the	formal	conception	of	
the	rule	of	law	cannot	meaningfully	constrain	a	necessarily	discretionary,	emergency	response.	
	
The	 public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 goes	 hand-in-hand	 with	 theories	 of	
deliberative	democracy.	Deliberative	democrats	emphasize	the	collective	democratic	project	of	
generating	reasoned	decisions	through	public	deliberation.50		They	argue	that	persuasion	is	“the	
most	 justifiable	 form	 of	 political	 power	 because	 it	 is	 the	most	 consistent	with	 respecting	 the	
autonomy	of	persons,	their	capacity	for	self-government.”51	Deliberative	democrats	accordingly	
seek	to	delineate	conditions	for	ensuring	public	decisions	can	be	guided	to	the	extent	possible	
by	persuasion	achieved	through	actual	deliberation.52	Democracy,	on	this	view,	is	more	than	just	
majority	 rule.	 It	 is	 a	process	of	public	decision-making	 that	 strives	 to	 treat	 individuals	as	 free,	
equal	 and	 capable	 of	 giving	 and	 receiving	 reasons	 for	 collective	 action. 53 	The	 rule-of-law	
requirement	 of	 public	 justification	 thus	 fits	 comfortably	 within	 a	 deliberative	 democracy.	 It	
requires	 “a	 culture	 of	 justification,”54	in	 which	 public	 officials	 are	 expected	 to	 offer	 reasoned	
justification	for	their	decisions	and	in	which	those	subject	to	these	decisions	are	empowered	to	
challenge	them	when	they	are	not	justified	in	accordance	with	fundamental	principles.	All	public	
institutions	must	be	part	of	this	project	of	justification,	meaning	that	on	this	view,	realizing	the	
																																																								
50	Jürgen	Habermas,	Between	Facts	and	Norms,	translated	by	William	Rehg	(Cambridge:	MIT	Press,	1996);	
Amy	Gutmann	&	Dennis	Thompson,	Why	Deliberative	Democracy?	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	
2004)	at	3;	John	S.	Dryzek	with	Simon	Niemeyer,	Foundations	and	Frontiers	of	Deliberative	Governance	
(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2010)	at	3.	
51	Amy	Gutmann,	“Democracy”	in	Robert	E.	Goodin,	Philip	Pettit	&	Thomas	Pogge	eds,	A	Companion	to	
Contemporary	Political	Philosophy	(Oxford:	Blackwell	Publishing,	2007)	521	at	527.	See	also	Habermas,	
supra	note	50	at	306	(what	he	calls	the	“unforced	force	of	the	better	argument”).	
52	Gutmann	&	Thompson,	supra	note	50	at	100.	
53	Joshua	Cohen,	"Deliberation	and	Democratic	Legitimacy"	James	Bonham	&	William	Rehg	eds,	
Deliberative	Democracy:	Essays	on	Reason	and	Politics	(Cambridge,	Mass:	MIT	Press,	1997)	67	at	75.	
54		Etienne	Mureinik,	“A	Bridge	to	Where?	Introducing	the	Interim	Bill	of	Rights”	(1994)	10	South	African	
Journal	on	Human	Rights	32;	David	Dyzenhaus,	“Law	as	Justification:	Etienne	Mureinik's	Conception	of	
Legal	Culture”	(1998)	14	South	African	Journal	on	Human	Rights	11.	See	also	David	Dyzenhaus,	Hard	Cases	
in	Wicked	Legal	Systems	(Oxford:	Claredon	Press,	1991)	at	263-4	(on	the	connection	between	common	
law	constitutionalism	and	the	reason-giving	legislature).	
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rule	of	law	is	a	collective	effort	amongst	legislators,	judges,	administrative	decision-makers	and	
the	individuals	that	accept	or	contest	their	decisions.	
	
A	 libertarian	might	 respond,	as	Epstein	does,	by	arguing	 that	public-justification,	while	nice	 in	
theory,	does	not	work	in	practice.	Epstein	writes:	
Discretion	 is,	 to	many	people,	 the	better	part	of	valor.	But	not	 in	public	affairs,	where	
discretion	 leads	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 indefinite	 property	 rights	 that	 invite	 political	
maneuvering	 of	 the	 types	 that	 traditionally	 have	marred	 areas	 of	 labor	 and	 land	 use	
regulation.55	
In	other	words,	Epstein	points	out	that	our	public	institutions	fail.	They	succumb	to	capture	by	
powerful	interests	and	the	courts	are	not	always	capable	of	providing	an	effective	check	on	their	
exercises	of	power.56	
	
Indeed,	some	public	 institutions	do	fail.	And	some	are	likely	to	be	more	susceptible	to	capture	
than	others.	But	 these	 failures	are	not	 inevitable	and	“The	Environmental	Emergency”	offered	
examples	of	institutions	endeavouring	to	ensure	public	justification.57	To	be	clear:	nothing	in	the	
public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 undermines	 a	 commitment	 to	 governing	
through	 legislated	 rules	 that	 comply	 with	 the	 formal	 features	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	
environmental	emergency	framework	and	the	public-justification	conception	that	follows	from	
it	 are	 deliberately	 agnostic	 about	 whether	 we	 should	 attempt	 to	 address	 any	 particular	
environmental	 issue	 primarily	 through	 abstract,	 general	 rules	 or	 by	 delegating	 significant	
discretion	 to	 administrative	 decision-makers	 (of	 any	 sort).58	This	 is	 not	 because	 I	 do	 not	 have	
views	 on	 the	 forms	 of	 regulation	 that	 are	 best	 suited	 to	 address	 individual	 environmental	
																																																								
55	Epstein,	Design,	supra	note	3	at	191-2.	
56	See	also	Cass	R	Sunstein	and	Adrian	Vermeule,	“Libertarian	Administrative	Law”	(2015)	82	University	of	
Chicago	Law	Review	393	at	416.	
57	Stacey,	“The	Environmental	Emergency”,	supra	note	2	at	51-3.	
58	See	also:	Hoi	Kong,	“The	Deliberative	City”	(2010)	28:2	Windsor	Yearbook	of	Access	to	Justice”	411	at	
417-9.	Even	where	Pardy	thinks	we	agree,	I	am	afraid	we	do	not.	Contrary	to	his	response	(Pardy,	
“Unbearable”,	supra	note	7	at	20-1),	I	do	not	think	that	independent	expert	decision-makers	are	
necessarily	bad.	Any	complex	society	must	rely	extensively	on	experts	to	function.	“The	Environmental	
Emergency”	argued	that	independent	experts	cannot	redeem	the	formal	conception	of	the	rule	of	law	(at	
41-2).	At	the	risk	of	repetition,	independent	expert	decision-making	complies	with	the	rule	of	law	when	it	
is	publicly	justified.	Independent	experts,	just	as	any	administrative	decision-maker,	must	offer	reasons	
that	demonstrate	to	those	affected	that	their	decisions	are	fair	and	reasonable.	
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problems;	 I	do.	 It	 is	because	these	views	are	part	of	the	democratic	debate	that	 is	ensured	by	
the	rule	of	law.	They	are	not	internal	to	the	rule	of	law	itself.		
	
Public	justification	means	that	whenever	the	state	comes	in	contact	with	the	lives	of	individuals	
it	must	offer	 reasoned	 justification	 for	 its	decision	and	that	 the	decision	can	be	challenged	on	
the	basis	that	it	fails	to	show	that	the	decision	has	legal	warrant	consistent	with	constitutional	
principles.	 This	 amounts	 to	 a	 license	 for	 arbitrariness	 only	 if	 one	 adheres	 to	 the	 libertarian’s	
prior	belief	that	state	interference	with	the	private	relations	of	individuals	is	inherently	suspect.	
Public	 justification,	 in	 contrast,	 takes	 seriously	 the	 idea	 that	 individuals	and	 the	 institutions	 in	
which	they	participate	can	collectively	reason	about	decisions	affecting	the	environment,	while	
also	respecting	each	individual’s	right	to	be	free	from	arbitrary	public	decisions.59		
	
Government	decisions	that	are	publicly	justifiable	may	well	interfere	with	the	property	rights	of	
private	 parties.	 Under	 the	 libertarian’s	 preferred	 conception	 of	 freedom—freedom	 as	 non-
interference—such	 decisions	 may	 arguably	 compromise	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	 individuals	 they	
touch.	 However,	 under	 the	 republican	 conception	 of	 freedom	 that	 underwrites	 the	 public-
justification	conception	of	the	rule	of	law—freedom	as	non-domination—such	decisions	do	not	
compromise	freedom,	precisely	because	their	publicly	justifiable	nature	entails	that	they	are	not	
arbitrary.	Under	the	republican	conception	of	 freedom,	an	 interference	compromises	 freedom	
only	if	it	arises	from	the	decision	that	is	unjustifiable	and	therefore	arbitrary.			
	
III.	Public	Justification	in	Environmental	Law	
	
Parts	 I	 and	 II	 responded	 to	 Pardy’s	 confused	 assessment	 of	 the	 primary	 argument	 in	 “The	
Environmental	Emergency.”	Relying	on	the	emergency	framework,	I	clarified	that	a	common	law	
constitutional	conception	of	the	rule	of	law	can	respond	to	Schmitt’s	challenge	and	thus	provide	
an	account	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	 capable	of	 governing	 the	environment.	 I	 further	 elaborated	 the	
theory	 behind	 common	 law	 constitutionalism,	 how	 it	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 requirement	 of	 public	
justification,	 and	 why	 this	 is	 a	 superior	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 the	 one	 advanced	
elsewhere	 by	 Pardy.	 This	 Part	 turns	 to	 Pardy’s	 direct	 criticisms	 of	 the	 public-justification	
conception	of	the	rule	of	 law.	 In	particular,	 I	 take	up	the	role	of	reasons	 in	environmental	 law																																																									
59	See	generally,	Richardson,	supra	note	45.	
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and	 the	 potential	 for	 creative	 institutional	 design.	 These	 matters	 are	 ripe	 for	 future	
environmental	 law	 scholarship	 that	 seeks	 to	 expand	 upon	 the	 common	 law	 constitutional	
conception	of	the	rule	of	law.		
	
Pardy	 observes	 that	 many	 administrative	 decision-makers	 do	 not	 offer	 reasons	 for	 their	
decisions	and	that,	when	they	do,	these	reasons	may	be	inconsistent	with	previous	decisions.	In	
his	view,	current	practice	undermines	the	conception	of	the	rule	of	 law	that	 I	advance	in	“The	
Environmental	Emergency.”	This	argument	is	perplexing	given	that	the	account	that	I	defend	is	
aspirational	 in	 nature.60	The	 fact	 that	 administrative	 decision-makers	 currently	 do	 not	 offer	
public	 reasons	 for	 their	 decisions	 does	 not	mean	 they	 cannot.	When	 they	 fail	 to	 offer	 public	
reasons	that	adequately	justify	their	decisions,	they	fail	to	comply	with	the	rule	of	law.	
	
An	 interesting	 question	 is	 what	might	 “count”	 as	 adequate	 reasons	 in	 light	 of	 the	 variety	 of	
environmental	decisions	that	are	made	in	Canadian	environmental	law.	Important	decisions	are	
often	made	by	way	of	orders	 in	council,	 regulation	or	environmental	permits.	The	 reasons	 for	
the	decision	may	therefore	need	to	take	an	unconventional	form	which	may	further	contribute	
to	 judicial	 reluctance	 to	 engage	 directly	 with	 the	 reasoning	 underpinning	 these	 decisions.61	
While	 I	 cannot	answer	 this	question	 satisfactorily	 in	 the	 scope	of	 this	 reply,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
note	 that	 the	 requirement	 to	offer	 reasons	need	not	 come	 from	 the	 court.62	Indeed,	 in	many	
instances	the	legislature	has	been	the	more	proactive	institution	and	legislated	a	reason-giving	
requirement.	The	federal	Species	at	Risk	Act,	 for	example,	requires	the	Governor	 in	Council	 to	
offer	reasons	when	it	declines	to	protect	a	species	under	the	Act.63	In	some	cases,	the	executive	
might	 implement	 a	 reason-giving	 requirement	 on	 its	 own	 initiative,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 with	 the	
Cabinet	 Directive	 on	 Regulatory	 Management,	 which	 requires	 a	 publicly	 available	 regulatory																																																									
60	Stacey,	“The	Environmental	Emergency”,	supra	note	2	at	45-6	(noting	the	ways	in	which	the	Supreme	
Court	has	fallen	short	of	this	conception)	and	at	note	203	(explicitly	stating	that	the	public-justification	
conception	is	aspirational).	For	a	nice	articulation	of	how	the	rule	of	law	can	be	understood	as	both	
practice	and	aspiration,	see:	Nigel	E	Simmonds,	Law	as	a	Moral	Idea	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	
2007),	in	particular	at	52-4.		
61	Stacey,	“The	Environmental	Emergency”,	supra	note	2	at	34-35	(offering	examples	of	judicial	reluctance	
to	engage	with	the	reasons	for	environmental	decisions).	
62	Pardy,	“Unbearable”,	supra	note	7	at	7	(citing	Baker	v	Canada	(Minister	of	Citizenship	and	Immigration),	
[1999]	2	SCR	817,	174	DLR	(4th)	193).	
63	Species	At	Risk	Act,	SC	2002,	c	29,	s	27(1.2).	Note	that	arguably	the	Governor	in	Council	does	not	need	
to	give	reasons	for	a	listing	because	it	has	implicitly	accepted	the	publicly-available	expert	assessment	of	
the	species	(s	25).	Therefore	public	justification	is	offered	in	both	instances.	
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impact	 analysis	prior	 to	proposing	new	 regulations.64	I	 offer	 these	examples	not	because	 they	
are	 ideal	 instances	 of	 reason-giving	 in	 environmental	 law,	 but	 rather	 because	 they	 suggest	 a	
commitment	on	the	part	of	the	legislature	and	executive,	at	least	in	some	cases,	to	governing	in	
accordance	with	a	public-justification	conception	of	the	rule	of	law.	
	
Pardy	 notes	 that,	 even	 where	 reasons	 are	 offered,	 administrative	 decision-makers	 are	 not	
subject	to	a	requirement	to	adhere	to	precedent	in	the	same	manner	as	courts.	But	it	is	worth	
asking	why	they	are	not.	Part	of	the	answer	lies	in	persistence	of	the	formal	conception	of	the	
rule	of	 law,	which	 treats	 the	administrative	 state	as	a	 legal	grey	hole.65	In	 contrast,	 subjecting	
administrative	 decisions	 to	 a	 robust	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 requires	 a	 considerable	
increase	in	attention	to	the	machinery	of	the	administrative	state	and	how	individual	decisions	
are	made.		
	
A	 close	 examination	 of	 these	 decisions	 may	 reveal	 that	 no	 two	 environmental	 decisions	 are	
exactly	alike,	due	to	the	complexity	and	evolving	nature	of	environmental	issues.	Yet	the	public	
justification	conception	requires	that	each	decision	be	reached	in	the	same	manner.	It	requires	
that	each	decision	reflect	 its	statutory	purpose,	taking	 into	account	prior	adequately	reasoned	
precedents,	and	if	necessary	justifying	departure	from	those	precedents	on	the	basis	of	relevant	
considerations.	When	decisions	are	not	supported	by	this	kind	of	public	reasoning—as	many,	if	
not	most,	environmental	decisions	currently	are	not—they	do	not	comply	with	the	rule	of	law.	
As	 I	 noted	 in	 the	 original	 article,	 the	 concepts	 of	 reasonableness	 and	 fairness	 require	 further	
elaboration	in	the	context	of	environmental	law.66	They	will	be	contested	and	sometimes	messy,	
as	they	are	in	other	areas	of	administrative	law.	But	the	process	of	contesting	and	refining	the	
requirements	 of	 reasonableness	 and	 fairness	 in	 any	 given	 case	 is	 precisely	 the	 aim	 of	 a	
democratic	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 persistence	 of	 the	 formal	 conception	 in	
environmental	 law	 has	 impeded	 the	 development	 of	 these	 common	 law	 requirements	 in	 the	
environmental	context.																																																									
64	Canada,	Her	Majesty	the	Queen	in	Right	of	Canada,	Cabinet	Directive	on	Regulatory	Management,	(1	
April	2012)	<	http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/hgw-cgf/priorities-priorites/rtrap-parfa/guides/cdrm-dcgr-
eng.asp#cha1	>	accessed	17	February	2016.	
65	Stacey,	“The	Environmental	Emergency”,	supra	note	2	at	32-36.	
66	Ibid	at	47,	50.	Elsewhere	I	have	argued	that	they	ought	to	be	informed	by	deliberative-democratic	
interpretations	of	environmental	principles:	Jocelyn	Stacey,	The	Constitution	of	the	Environmental	
Emergency		(DCL	Thesis,	McGill	University	Faculty	of	Law,	2015)	[unpublished].	
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Finally,	 Pardy	 takes	 issue	 with	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 public-justification	 conception	 for	 the	
separation	 of	 powers	 and	 institutional	 design.	 As	 should	 be	 clear,	 Pardy	 and	 I	 fundamentally	
disagree	 about	whether	 we	 ought	 to	 strive	 for	 a	 strict	 separation	 of	 powers	 or	 embrace	 the	
potential	 for	 creative	 institutional	 design	 as	 a	 way	 of	 promoting	 individual	 autonomy	 and	
meaningful	 participation	 in	 environmental	 governance.67 	Understanding	 autonomy	 as	 non-
domination,	as	set	out	in	Part	II,	opens	up	the	possibility	for	institutional	experimentation	that	
can	further	the	project	of	public	justification.	Courts	play	a	central	role	in	maintaining	the	rule	of	
law	 by	 requiring	 that	 other	 institutions	 publicly	 justify	 their	 decisions.	 But	 understanding	 the	
rule	 of	 law	 in	 this	 way	 allows	 for	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 how	 diverse	 institutions—
environmental	appeals	 tribunals,	auditor	generals,	ombudspersons,	amongst	others—also	play	
an	important	role	in	maintaining	the	rule	of	law	of	law.68	These	institutions	are	all	“strands	in	a	
web	of	public	 justification,”69	which	subject	the	full	 range	of	public	environmental	decisions	to	
scrutiny	that	a	generalist	court	on	its	own	cannot	provide.			
	
It	 is	worth	noting,	 in	conclusion,	 that	 the	public-justification	conception	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	has	
significant	and	immediate	practical	implications.	The	most	obvious	implication	is	that	it	provides	
a	 legitimate	 basis	 on	 which	 courts	 can	 intervene	 when	 environmental	 decision-makers	 have	
failed	to	justify	their	decisions	in	accordance	with	fundamental	common	law	principles.	To	offer	
one	 example,	 the	 recent	wave	 of	 judicial	 decisions	 that	 have	 legitimized	 the	National	 Energy	
Board’s	flawed	decision-making	process	demonstrates	the	need	to	advance	a	theory	of	law	that	
requires	 reasoned	 environmental	 decisions	 that	 reflect	 core	 common	 law	 principles.70	More	
generally,	 it	 also	 supplies	 a	 legal	 framework	 within	 which	 virtually	 any	 public	 environmental																																																									
67	See	also	Evan	Fox-Decent,	“Democratizing	Common	Law	Constitutionalism”	(2010)	55	McGill	LJ	511	
(defending	a	theory	of	common	law	constitutionalism	in	which	the	separation	of	powers	is	irrelevant).		
68	Stacey,	“The	Environmental	Emergency”,	supra	note	2	at	52-3.	Note	that	in	Western	Canada	Wilderness	
Committee	v	British	Columbia	(Forests,	Lands	and	Natural	Resource	Operations),	2014	BCSC	808,	the	Court	
held	that	the	Board	was	the	appropriate	forum	but	went	ahead	and	decided	the	matter	anyway,	denying	
any	distinctive	role	to	the	Board.	
69	David	Dyzenhaus,	“The	Politics	of	Deference:	Judicial	Review	and	Democracy”	in	Michael	Taggart	ed,	
The	Province	of	Administrative	Law	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	1997)	279	at	305.	
70	Sinclair	v.	Canada	(National	Energy	Board),	2014	FCA	245;	Quarmby	v	National	Energy	Board	of	Canada,	
2015	FCA	19	(leave	to	appeal	refused);	Quarmby	v	Canada	(AG),	2015	CarswellNat4252	(SCC)	(leave	to	
appeal	refused);	National	Energy	Board,	"Court	Challenges	to	National	Energy	Board	or	Governor	in	
Council	Decisions"	(City	of	Vancouver	v	NEB	and	Trans	Mountain	Pipeline	ULC),	online:	NEB	
<https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/pplctnflng/crt/index-eng.html>	(leave	to	appeal	refused).	
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commitment,	 however	half-hearted,	 should	be	 taken	as	 evidence	of	 a	 commitment	 to	public-
justification	and	used	as	a	basis	for	deriving	more	robust	legal	requirements	than	are	currently	
recognized	in	Canadian	environmental	law.71	
	
Conclusion	
	
Pardy	 and	 I	 share	 three	 common	 premises	 about	 environmental	 law.	We	 both	maintain	 that	
environmental	issues	are	properly	situated	within	the	theory	of	complex,	adaptive	systems.	We	
agree	that	this	understanding	of	ecological	complexity,	in	turn,	presents	a	challenge	for	realizing	
the	 rule	of	 law	 in	 the	environmental	 context.	We	also	agree	 that	 it	 is	nonetheless	possible	 to	
remain	committed	to	environmental	governance	under	the	rule	of	law.	I	argue	that	these	three	
premises	 can	 be	 explored	 by	 understanding	 environmental	 issues	 as	 an	 ongoing	 emergency.	
Pardy	 disagrees.	 However,	 this	 reply	 has	 argued	 that	 Pardy’s	 critiques	 miss	 their	 marks.	 The	
emergency	 perspective	 allows	 us	 to	 unpack	 the	 rule-of-law	 assumptions	 implicit	 in	 the	 deep	
administrative	structures,	if	not	the	current	practice	of	Canadian	environmental	law.	And,	more	
importantly,	 it	 provides	 a	 foundation	 for	 building	 a	 robust	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	
(environmental)	 law,	 one	 that	 requires	 every	 public	 environmental	 decision	 to	 be	 justified	on	
the	basis	of	core	constitutional	principles.	
	
	
																																																								
71	I	am	thinking	here	of	initiatives	like	the	Alberta	Environmental	Monitoring	and	Reporting	Agency,	
criticized	for	its	lack	of	independence	and	legislated	structure	(Shaun	Fluker,	“Protecting	Alberta's	
Environment	Act:	A	Keystone	Kops	Response	to	Environmental	Monitoring	and	Reporting	in	Alberta”	
(2014)	ABLawg,	online:	http://ablawg.ca/2014/01/02/protecting-albertas-environment-act-a-keystone-
kops-response-to-environmental-monitoring-and-reporting-in-alberta/)	and	the	federal	government’s	
Federal	Sustainable	Development	Act,	SC	2008,	c33,	which	authorizes	certain	(weak)	reporting	and	
planning	requirements.	The	exception	to	this	statement	would	be	where	legislation	clearly	and	
unequivocally	limits	or	eliminates	common	law	requirements	of	fairness	and	reasonableness.	
